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PARTICIPATION OF THE INJURED PARTY 
IN SLOVENIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
The historical development of the criminal process has led to the idea of the 
public nature of the criminal justice system. The view that the state is the 
injured party in criminal cases evolved to a stage where the public prosecutor 
was given a monopoly of the criminal charge (Krapac, 1985; Sebba, 1982). 
Some authors have argued that the victim had, therefore, been “totally forgotten 
by the penal system” (Sebba, 1982, p. 226). However, in recent decades, the 
role of the victim of crime is becoming increasingly important (O’Hara, 2005, 
p. 237). International and supranational organisations, in particular the Council 
of Europe, the European Union, and the United Nations have adopted various 
victims’ rights instruments. The most significant European instrument on 
victims’ rights is arguably the Directive 2012/29/EU of 25 October 2012, 
establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims 
of crime (Androulakis, 2014; Buczma, 2013). The Directive grants victims, 
inter alia, the right to participate in the criminal procedure [1]. 
The Slovenian legal system provides various possibilities for victims to 
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participate in criminal proceedings. For this reason, many of the Directive’s 
requirements regarding victim participation had already been met in pre-
existing legislation. For example, the existing legislation already guaranteed 
that any victim of a crime had the right to be heard, the right to legal aid, and 
the right to reimbursement of expenses [2]. The strong position of the victim in 
the Slovenian legal system is rooted in the Yugoslav legal heritage. The 
Yugoslav Criminal Procedure Act of 1976 contained, as Krapac pointed out 
(Krapac, 1985, 2002), “a whole array of provisions concerning the victims’ role 
in the criminal process”, including the victim’s right to participate in the 
criminal procedure and contribute to the procedural material (provide 
evidence). These provisions were later incorporated into the Slovenian Criminal 
Procedure Act (CPA) in 1994. 
Under the CPA, the victim of a crime may assume different procedural 
roles. The right to prosecute a criminal offence mainly rests in the domain of 
public prosecutors and if the criminal offence is subject to public prosecution, 
the victim may participate in criminal proceedings merely as an injured party. 
For certain criminal offences the CPA allows victims to institute and conduct 
the prosecution (thus acting as a private prosecutor), and in some instances, the 
victim may appear as a subsidiary prosecutor in the case of the dismissal of 
charges by the public prosecutor [3]. The private and the subsidiary prosecutor 
exercise the rights of an authorised prosecutor (they have the status of a party to 
criminal proceedings). 
In criminal cases, in which the criminal offence is subject to public 
prosecution, the rights granted to the injured party include: the right to be 
present during criminal justice proceedings, the right to inspect the case files, 
the right to produce evidence, pose questions to the witnesses and experts with 
the permission of the presiding judge, the right to make a closing argument 
upon completion of the hearing of evidence, and the right to appeal against the 
final verdict on limited grounds [4]. 
Despite the wide range of procedural rights of the injured party, until 
recently the case law of the Slovenian Constitutional Court (hereinafter: the 
Constitutional Court) maintained the idea of criminal law as the ius puniendi of 
the state [5]. In 2001, the Court had to decide whether the right to an appeal 
stemming from Article 25 of the Constitution had been violated by the 
provision, which had not provided the injured party the right to appeal a 
judgment of the first instance criminal court [6]. The Constitutional Court 
answered negatively. Its decisions established that the object of the criminal 
procedure was (still) a decision on the criminal charges and not on the rights of 
the injured party. In 2017, however, the Constitutional Court released nothing 
short of a “revolution” in relation to the understanding of criminal procedure. 
The Constitutional Court linked the procedural rights of the injured party to the 
principle of human dignity, and, in a key part of the decision, proclaimed that 
“a criminal court decides not only on the criminal charges but also on the 
 242 
interests of the injured party, including civil claims arising from the criminal 
offence, as well as the interest that his or her personal dignity as the victim of 
the criminal offence be adequately respected in the criminal proceedings” 
(Republic of Slovenia Constitutional Court, 2017) [7]. Based on this argument, 
the Court concluded that the provision of the CPA limiting the injured party’s 
right to appeal to the costs of criminal proceedings was unconstitutional. 
The Court’s decision represents an interesting manifestation of blurred 
boundaries between criminal and civil law [8]. The criminal proceedings are no 
longer seen as a matter between the defendant and the state. However, as much 
as the victim’s interests deserve legal recognition, a too strong position of the 
victim could interfere with the fundamental principles of criminal procedure, 
especially with the legitimate interests of the accused [9], by indirectly 
strengthening the position of the state and other prosecutors (Plesec & Gorkič, 
2019). Since the CPA Amendment, which implemented the Constitutional 
Court’s decision [10], does not provide any precise criteria, the challenge of 
finding the right balance between the injured party’s right to appeal and the 
principles of modern criminal procedure seems to be left almost entirely in the 
hands of the Slovenian judiciary. 
As described above, Slovenian criminal procedure provides various 
possibilities for victims to participate in criminal proceedings. However, some 
unanswered questions regarding the injured party’s right to appeal and its 
integration in the modern (Slovenian) criminal procedure still remain. When 
answering these questions, one must consider that rethinking victims’ 
procedural rights means rethinking the fundamental principles of our criminal 
system. 
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